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THE COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT AND
ITS LIMITATIONS
LYSLE R. DIRRIM
of the Denver Bar
Copyright is the law's recognition of an author's rights in
the product of his own artistic creation. This intangible right can
be secured by statute or by the application of the common law.
At the offset, it should be pointed out that this article is only in-
terested in the latter, the common-law rights of the author.
The common-law theory of copyright takes the author as the
principle object of protection. This theory is so popular in Europe
that the term "droits des auteurs" (rights of authors), is used
instead of copyright.1 In the United States this common-law right
is usually referred to as the right of first publication. The justi-
fication for this common-law right lies in the theory that the
claim of the artistic creator to an unpublished manuscript is based
upon the production and labor of the author and his right to share
in the profits resulting from dissemination of his labor.-'
The Court stated in King Features v. Fleischer :3
"To what is the artist or author entitled as his
conception and what if such original conception has been
appropriated? He is entitled to any lawful use of his
property whereby he may get a profit out of it. Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 Fed. 30. It is the commercial value of
his property that he is protected for, to encourage the
arts by securing to him the monopoly in the sale of the
objec.t of the attraction. Gamber v. Ball. CB (NS) 306."
This right of first Dublication was recognized and protected
by Congress when, under proper constitutional power, 4 they en-
acted the Copyright Statute which states in Section 2 :5
"Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul
or limit the right of the author or proprietor of an un-
published work, at common law or in equity, to prevent
the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work
without his consent and to obtain damages therefor."
The existence of the common-law right is of great importance
to the author of literary property. It gives him a property right
in his creation that accrues automatically by the very act of writ-
ing. The form of literary property which is covered by the com-
mon law is the right to control the public use of a manuscript up
to the moment when it is first generally published. It is the sole
right of the author to decide by whom, when, where, and in what
form, his manuscript shall be published for the first time, to
IShafter, Alfred M., Shafter Musical Copyright (1939), p. 119.
-Pushman v. New York, 39 N. E. 2d 249 (1942).
1229 F. 533 (Copyright Office Bulletin No. 20,360) (1925).
1U. S. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 8.
'Title 17, U. S. C., Sec. 2.
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restrain others from publishing it without his permission and
from using it without his authority, and to recover damages from
those publishing it without his permission or using it without his
authority. The idea of the common-law property right should be
kept distinguished from the other form of literary property right
which is statutory and gives the right of monopoly after the first
general publication.;
This property right has been defined as an intangible, abso-
lute right which is purely incorporeal and is attendant with con-
siderations entirely different from any involved in other rights.-
Mr. Justice Holmes said of copyright property:S
"The notion of property starts, I suppose, from con-
firmed possession of a tangible object and consists in
the right to exclude others from interference with the
more or less free doing with it as one wills. But in copy.
right property has reached a more abstract expression.
The right to exclude is not directed to an object in pos-
session or owned, but is in vacuo so to speak. It restrains
the spontaneity of men where but for it there would be
nothing of any kind to hinder their doing as they saw fit.
It is a prohibition of conduct remote from the persons
or tangibles of the party having the right. It may be
infringed a thousand miles from the owner and without
his ever becoming aware of the wrong. It is a right
which could not be recognized or endured for more than
a limited time, and thereafter, I may remark in passing,
it is one which can hardly be conceived except as a
product of statute, as the authorities now agree.
In the above case Mr. Justice Holmes was speaking of the
statutory concept of copyright property. The common-law right.
on the other hand, is not the product of statute and, as we shall
see, may endure indefinitely. However, the common-law right
can also be said to be in vacuo, just as the statutory copyright,
and may achieve all the things Mr. Justice Holmes said could not
have been achieved but for statute.
The Courts have recognized a difference between the prop-
erty of a creator in his idea and that of his manuscript, paper and
ink. 9 In Stephens v. Cady, the Court stated :10
"But since the literary property in a manuscript is
and always has been separate from the actual manu-
script itself, that is, something in the nature of a chose
in action, the right to publish may not be inferred from
the mere possession of the manuscript. . . . As above
stated, literary rights have always been held to be separa-
GShaw, Ralph R., Literary Property in the Uvited States (1950), pp. 12, 26;
Golding v. RKO, 193 P. 2d 153 (1948).
,34 Am. Jur. 402 (1941).
8white-Smith v. Appolo, 209 U. S. 19 (1908)..
'Brunner v. Stix, 181 S. W. 2d 643 (1944).
155 U. S. 528, 14 L. Ed. 528 (1852).
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able from the manuscript itself. . . . There is no ques-
tion but that it is a different and independent right from
the usual right of ownership of an article of personal
property."
The Court, in Local Trademarks v. Price," said that a copy-
right was in the nature of a privilege or franchise in distinguish-
ing between the idea of a personal property right and that of a
literary property right and stated:
"A copyright is an intangible, incorporeal right in
the nature of a privilege or franchise and is independent
of any material substance such as the manuscript or
plate used for printing. It is entirely disconnected there-
from.
"The principle is clearly stated by the Court in
Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., C.C., 142 F.
827, 830, thus: 'The author of a painting, when it is
finished, before publication, owns a material piece of
property, consisting of the canvas and the paint upon it.
He also owns an incorporeal right connected with it;
that is, the right to make a copy of it. These two kinds
of property, although growing out of the same intellectual
production are in their nature essentially and inherently
distinct .. . ."
WHAT THE COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT PROTECTS
Copyright, whether statutory or common law, protects only
the expression of an idea and is only concerned with its form of
presentation. It does not protect the idea itself or the facts con-
tained therein. The Court pointed this out in Brunner v. Stix,
supra,r - in stating:
"There is a distinction between the property of a
creator in his idea and his property in the manuscript
setting forth his idea (property in a personal chattel),
as well as his right to prevent others from reproducing
his expressions of his ideas-the present day common-
law right to make original publication and statutory au-
thority to multiply copies for a limited time to the exclu-
sion of others. Common law and statutory copyright
•. .*are monopolistic in nature. Generally speaking,
one's common-law monopolistic right to publish a literary
work ceases upon publication and statutory copyright
continues the monopolistic right to multiply copies there-
after for a limited period. . . . Copyright protects the
expression of an idea. It does not protect the idea."
The basis to understanding literary property is the fact that
the only thing protected is a particular form of presentation.
And even that is not protected in the same degree that patents
protect inventions. To obtain a patent, an inventor must show
11170 F. 2d 715 (1948).
'= Id. at p. 3.
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sufficient novelty in execution of the method or mechanism which
he wishes to protect to support his claim of originality. Once
his patent is granted, anyone else who hits upon the same idea
and the same or a similar method of carrying out that idea will
be stopped, during the life of the prior patent, from making or
using or selling his invention.
None of this is true with respect to literary property. Liter-
ary property rights are granted without examination for novelty.
In copyright, if the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of
totally different manners, a plurality of copyrights may result
and no infringement will exist.
13
It is obvious that if an author could have a monopoly on his
ideas and materials used in his creation and could prevent their
use by other authors, each copyright would narrow the field of
thought open for development and exploitation, and science, poetry,
narrative and dramatic fiction and other branches of literature
would be hindered by copyright instead of being promoted.
The purpose of copyright and how far its protection should
extend is shown by the Court's ruling in Holmes v. Hurst :14
"The object of copyright is to promote science and
the useful arts. If an author by originating a new ar-
rangement and form of expression of certain ideas or
conceptions could withdraw these ideas or conceptions
from the stock of materials to be used by other authors,
each copyright would narrow the field of thought open
for development and exploitation; and science, poetry,
narrative, and dramatic fiction and other branches of
literature would be hindered by copyright instead of
being promoted. A poem consists of words, expressing
conceptions of words or lines of thought, but copyright
in the poem gives no monopoly in the separate words or
in the ideas, conceptions, or facts expressed or described
by the words. A copyright extends only to the arrange-
ment of words. A copyright does not give a monopoly in
any incident in a play. Other authors have a right to
exploit the facts, experiences, field of thought, and gen-
eral ideas, provided they do not substantially copy a con-
crete form in which the circumstances and ideas have
been developed, arranged and put into shape."
One of the advantages and attributes of common-law copy-
right is that it is perpetual as compared with statutory copyright,
which is limited to a 26 year term and renewable for an additional
26 years. The common-law copyright may last theoretically for-
ever, the lifetime of the creator, his heirs, or whom he assigns or
otherwise transfers it to, although it may be lost at any time by
a general publication or abandonment. 15
1' Shaw, op cit. sitpro, note 6 at p. 2; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F. 2d 691 (Copy-
right Office Bulletin 20, 201) (1926).
11174 U. S. 82; 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899).
"Willemberg, Philip, Literary Property (1937); Werckmeister v. American




Although the common-law copyright has been said to be en-
tirely different from that of any other property right, the creator
or owner of a common-law copyright may sell, transfer or assign
his property right or any portions thereof in the same manner
as he would any other property right. The sales may be absolute
or conditional and may be oral or written.
The property right may also be bequeathed by will or may
pass to the personal representative of the owner upon the death
of the owner. 16
LIMITATIONS OF THE COMMON-LAW COPYRIGHT
Although the common-law copyright gives protection to the
uninformed creator, perhaps when it is needed most, by the very
act of creating any writing, the common-law copyright has cer-
tain and sometimes disastrous limitations. Where the creator
may unknowingly acquire the protection of the common-law copy-
right he may unknowingly lose this protection.
THE EFFECT OF STATUTORY TO COMMON-LAW RIGHTS
It is a general rule that the common-law copyright and the
statutory copyright cannot co-exist in the same composition. The
acquisition of the statutory copyright destroys the common-law
right, the author is deemed to have accepted the statutory right
in place of his common-law right.
1'7
In Societe Des Films, Menchem v. Vitagraph Co. of America,
the Court stated:' s
"The author of an unpublished dramatic composi-
tion has a right of election to content himself with com-
mon-law copyright or to substitute therefor the right
afforded by copyright statute to exclusive representation
by complying with statutory provisions.
"A common-law and statutory copyright may not
exist concurrently but statutory copyright divests owner-
ship of his common-law right."
GENERAL PUBLICATION
One of the most common ways to terminate a common-law
literary property right is by abandonment or dedication to the
public. A general publication is dedication to public use. Also,
one of the basic problems confronting common-law copyrights is
the question of publication and what constitutes publication in a
given situation.
General publication consists of selling, offering for sale, or
dedication to the public by general distribution one or more copies
of the work in question.' 9
'618 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 141 (1939).
17Tompkins v. Hallick, 133 Mass. 32 (1882); Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus, 210
U. S. 346 (1907).
8 251 F. 258, 163 C.C.A. 414.
"Wincan, Richard, How to Secure a Copyright (1950).
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While some courts have held that intent is necessary before
the author is deemed to have dedicated to the public, other courts
have held that intent is immaterial.
In Holmes v. Hurst, supra,20 the United States Supreme Court
ruled:
"If an author permits his intellectual production to
be published either serially or collectively, his right to
a copyright is lost as effectually as the right of an in-.
ventor to a patent upon an invention which he deliber-
ately abandons to the public, and this too irrespective
of his actual intention not to make such abandonment."
While it is not clear whether actual intent is needed on the
part of the author to constitute dedication to the public, probably
the better rule is that intent may be assumed by the author's acts.
This rule was followed in the Werckmeister case where the Court
said :21
"A general publication consists of such a disclosure,
communication, circulation, exhibition, or distribution of
the subject of copyright, tendered or given to one or
more members of the general public as implies an aban-
donment of the right of copyright or its dedication to
the public."
In a more recent interesting case 22 plaintiffs alleged the de-
fendants unlawfully appropriated plans for a residential building
and the plans were common-law property of the plaintiff.
The facts showed that the plaintiff had previously built a
house in accordance with the plans in question and that the house
was held open to inspection by the public.
The Court held that holding a house open for public inspec-
tion was a publication of the plans and stated:
"The creator of a unique intellectual production, such
as a picture, a book, a play, a compilation of facts or
an architectural plan, has a property right in the thing
created. This property right attaches to the incorporeal
idea which has taken definite form in the mind of the
creator, as distinguished from the paper upon which it is
portrayed or the material of which it is physically com-
posed. It is recognized at common law. No copyright
statute is required in order for the creator of a unique
intellectual product to protect such property from un-
authorized invasion, appropriation or conversion. The
property right is based upon the established principle
that every man is entitled to the fruits of his own effort,
mental as well as physical.
"The property right above mentioned needs no statu-
tory enactment for its protection so long as the creator,
20174 U. S. 85, 19 Sup. Ct. 606 (1899).
211d. at p. 6.
11 Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 397, 405 (1938).
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and therefore the owner of the product retains control
of it, or until he voluntarily dedicates it to all the world;
but if the owner releases it for general and unrestricted
publication he can no longer reap benefits from its use
except he may have it copyrighted under the statute. .. "
While the courts have not been definite as to what constitutes
a general publication, the main question seems to be whether there
was a publication to the members of the general public. In the
following cases the author was deemed to have publicated to the
general public: by delivery of copies to the Secretary of State, by
a gratuitous presentation of a book to public libraries, appearance
of a pamphlet in a public hotel, and by filing of the author's work
in a public office.
PARTIAL PUBLICATION
Probably, part of the courts' difficulty in determining what is
publication or dedication to the public is the distinction they place
on general and limited publication. While we have seen that a gen-
eral publication to the public will terminate an author's common-
law copyright, the courts have held that a limited publication is
entitled to the common law protection.
In Berry v. Hoffman,24 the Court stated:
"Every communication of knowledge of the contents
of a literary composition is in a sense a publication. How-
ever, the cases dealing with copyright early recognized a
distinction between a general publication and a limited
publication. When the communication is to a select num-
ber upon conditions express or implied, that it is not in-
tended to be thereafter common property, the publica-
tion is then said to be limited.
"The test is whether there is or is not such a surren-
der as permits the absolute and unqalified enjoyment of
the subject matter by the public or the members thereof
to whom it may be committed."
It appears that when a literary work is published or exhibited
for a limited and particular purpose or to a limited number of per-
sons it does not become public property and the author retains
ownership of the work.
The courts have held that the delivering of lectures before
audiences, exhibitions of paintings in private galleries, and the
private circulation of manuscripts is only partial or limited pub-
lication and not abandonment to the public use.
2 5
It therefore appears that by careful restrictions an author
may publicate and keep his common-law protection, but where the
line is to be drawn between a limited and general publication ap-
24 125 Pa. Superior Ct. 261, 189 Atl. 516 (1937).
Nutt v. National Institute, Inc., 31 Fed. 2d 236 (Copyright Office Bulletin
No. 20, 1935) p. 516; Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 F. 323;
68 L. R. A. 591 (1904).
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parently depends on a given situation and a given court with no set
rules.
PERFORMANCE
The courts have further confused the question of what is
publication by drawing a further distinction between publication
and performance. The courts have ruled that to reproduce copies
of a play to the public is publication but if you only perform your
works or play before the public you have not published .
2
In Brown v. Ferris 27 the Court stated the general rule as to
performance by stating:
"The law on the question seems well settled that the
publication of a literary work by an author is dedication
of same to the public; it becomes public property unless,
of course, he reserves such rights as the law allows him
by copyright. There is, however, a different rule governing
literary production. . . . In McCarthy & Fisher v. While,
259 Fed. 364, Judge A. Hand says, 'The defendants insist
that the presentation of the song by Holly in vaudeville
prior to the date of the copyright was a complete dedica-
tion to the public. It is, however, well settled that a
public performance of a dramatic or musical composition
is not an abandonment of the composition to the public.' "
It therefore appears from the foregoing cases that by per-
forming his works an author may make commercial use of his
work and make it known to the public without terminating his
common-law copyright.
LACHES
Although it may be called publication or abandonment, it
appears that an author may lose his common-law copyright on
the theory of laches or negligence.
Laches occurs when the author or composer is aware that his
works are being published or used by someone else, and remains
inactive and does nothing to assert his rights for an extended
period of time.
Some of the cases have endeavored to include this type of
situation under the heading of publication and go on the theory
that the author, by his unprotesting silence, has impliedly ac-
quiesed on consent to the publication by others of his creation.
But the more logical course would be to declare the author,
by virtue of his neglect, or laches, as having forfeited his rights,
and as having barred himself from suing for relief ordinarily had
under his common-law protection. His right remains but his
remedy is gone.
28
21 Thompkins v. Halleck, supra, at p. 7.
17 204 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1924) (Copyright Office Bulletin No. 20, 94) (1935).




Although, theoretically, the creator of literary property has
a property right by the very act of creating, the problems of proof
can be very great.
We have many cases in American history where the inspired
creator has suddenly jotted down his creation on scratch paper
or used any materials that were in his reach. If later, the question
of ownership or the time of the creation were to be questioned the
creator may have a next to impossible task as to the proof. The
difficulty of proof was evidenced by the George case 29 where the
author of "The Wreck of the Old 97" was finally able to prove his
ownership of this song against the R. C. A. Victor Company by
the testimony of his neighbors who had heard him and his daughter
play it years before it was recorded, and also, by an old copy
unearthed in a dusty trunk.
The courts have clearly placed the burden of proof on the
party who seeks to enforce a common-law copyright. In the
George case 30 the Court stated:
"When the supposed party sues for a violation of a
copyright the existence of those facts of originality, of
intellectual production, of thought, and conception on the
part of the author should be proved."
There are some authors and vaudeville organizations which
provide for the deposit and registration of songs, scripts and other
matters of a similar nature. As far as local or state governmental
agencies are concerned, California is the only known state pro-
viding for state registration of manuscripts.
31
It would appear that the common-law copyright can only
reach its full purpose and be of the greatest benefit to the own-
ers of unpublished works by the use of State or Federal agencies
that would provide for the registration of these unpublished works.
This would give the owner of the unpublished works a means of
proving ownership and provide for the fullest protection under
our common-law copyright rights.
IVictor Talking Machine Co. v. George, 69 Fed. 2d 871 (1934) (Copyright
Office Bulletin No. 20, p. 754).
Ibid.
Shafter, Alfred M., Shafter Musical Copyright (1939), p. 112.
To Be Sure-
The Colorado
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